Discrepancy, Surplus and Rhythm

Johnson’s rebuttal of Berkley’s immaterialism was material enough: he stubbed his toe, a demonstration that reality and what Berkley thought about reality were discrepant.

But what about the hurt that stubbing causes? Why do toddlers complain (about, say, a bump on the knee) when the hurt itself has faded? Perhaps they’re inventing memory, developing a sense of time in all its passing and perdurance: the hurt received back then versus the remedy just now delivered; what you thought was there versus what actually is there, and so on.

I quoted this from Scurati once before:

‘Here in the zone of contact, the cause does not precede the effect. Here the chronological order doesn’t matter. Here the cause of what has been done not only still has to be discovered but actually does not yet exist.’
(Antonio Scurati: Il sopravissuto)

This variant comes from Wu Ming:

‘We are on the summit of time, where the answer precedes the question, the effect precedes the cause, death precedes birth.

‘You had to climb this hill to understand the journey you had taken.’
(Wu Ming: Manituana)

But time is also rhythm.

Lazzarato describes (in Videofilosofia) how Bergson distinguishes between, on the one hand, time as perceived by the senses and, on the other, time as conceived by the intellect. There is more ‘reality’ in sensation, according to Bergson, and that ‘surplus’ of reality in perception is to be sought, according to Nietzsche, within the body. He then traces the whole thing back to an Aristotelian sense of time extensively measuring the movement that is in Nature (in other words a cosmology) versus a neo-Platonic view of time as intension, as measuring out the movement of the soul.

In Svevo’s La coscienza di Zeno the breathing of Zeno’s dying father has a fretful quality which Zeno imitates ‘almost unconsciously’, before affording himself pauses which he hopes to pass on to his patient. The rhythm of the father’s dying breaths seems to become part of the room ‘from that point and for a long, long time after that.’ In fact what Svevo seems to be describing here is the sort of entrainment whereby memory develops as a sort of felt persistence.

In a related passage Zeno plays the violin:

‘Even the lowest sort of being, once he knows what three, four and six note figures are, knows how to pass between them with the same rhythmical exactness as his eye knows how to pass from one set of notes to the next. With me, though, once I’ve played one of these figures, it sticks to me and will not let me go again, so that it gets mixed up with the figure following and deforms it. In order to put the notes in the right place I have to mark time both with my feet and with my head, and so much for nonchalance, for serenity, so much for music. Music that comes from an organism that’s in balance both is itself the time that it both creates and exhausts.’
(Svevo: La coscienza di Zeno)

And here, finally, for good measure, are some quotations from Sapienza in Onda, the Rome  section of the Anomalous Wave, 18 March 2009:

‘We have entered a new era. Today we can say this unambiguously, without prevarication. The recession is concrete reality: the government doesn’t doubt it: police against the students, police against dissenters, police and baton charges against those who won’t pay for this crisis!

‘The Wave isn’t dead. The Wave isn’t some memory of youth. The Wave is alive and it doesn’t intend to stop. The Wave causes fear.’

A Good Childhood

Having previously rescued children from the chimneys of industrial capitalism we have put them to work on the sofas of cognitive capitalism.

A Good Childhood is a so called ‘landmark report’ from the UK Children’s Society. According to a selective article in the Telegraph, it argues, inter alia, that television makes children mentally ill partly through advertisers’ messages that ‘you are what you own’ and partly through that medium’s practice of celebrity:

‘Children today know in intimate detail the lives of celebrities who are richer than they will ever be, and mostly better-looking. This exposure inevitably raises aspirations and reduces self-esteem.’

The reference to ‘aspirations’ here is peculiar. For a start, aspiration is more usually seen as one of capitalist society’s major drivers: you look across at the field belonging to that other chap, you see that it is greener, you apply some fertiliser to your own field and very soon everyone gains. It is this that underpins the hugely patronising (and often White) belief that inhabitants of US projects and slums are going to look up at Obama over the coming years and see not only a brave fulfilment of the dream of Dr King but also an inducement to themselves to give things one further heave.

And that, essentially, is its function in this view of how things work, an inducement to further effort, to fit in. But it’s a position from which, even though Tim Gill, for example, notes that children need to be autonomous, self directing and so forth, the Report as a whole will probably not dissent, its own sort of aspiration, other than at the margin. Aspiration, in other words, doesn’t seesaw with self esteem. Rather it works as social control in a way that desire, for instance, never can; which is what makes desire so subversive.

So here we have it: the dynamic model of capitalist aspiration. A carrot moves forward endlessly and therefore you do too, failing again and failing better, goaded onwards by a stick. Don’t do drugs and/or go to prison. Join the Democrats instead.

In a more topological model, one reaches towards the object of aspiration which always lies on the boundary of the very system within which one starts aspiring in the first place. In L’Europa e l’Impero, for example, Toni Negri notes how the US ‘empire’ is the skin or outer surface of a container for which we provide the contents, within which we live. And this, no doubt, is why (in a British context) the same mindless New Labour clique has looked successively to the vibrancy, if that’s the word, of WJ Clinton, GW Bush and now of BH Obama. Policy here is secondary if it’s relevant at all, because the issue is one of marques.

Nor are things much different in some Christian contexts. Christ is the object of imitation, the source of ‘living waters‘. However, that imitation is always radically incomplete. Either one never reaches that boundary (becoming fully alive is therefore always postponed) or else imitation fails in some other way: ‘[they have] hewed them out cisterns, broken cisterns, that can hold no water’ (Jeremiah).

As to the message that ‘you are what you own’ here are the children of Don Lorenzo Milani’s school in 1960s Barbiana (from Lettera ad una professoressa):

‘The poor create different tongues and then they struggle to renew them for ever. The rich crystallise these so that they can keep down those who do not speak as they do.’

Now what these children were complaining of was this: firstly that they were excluded from or dispossessed by others of a language which was theirs and secondly that a false and ‘crystallised’ form of that language (and this is similar to the commodification of ‘dead labour’) was then turned back on them prescriptively and proscriptively as a source for their (new) identity.

And this is actually quite serious. On the one hand there is an asymptotic relationship pre-existing between two aspects of language, a sort of ecology of the potential, which must not be destroyed:

‘The true culture, that which no one has so far possessed, is made up of two things: belonging to the group and possessing the power of individual speech.’  (Lettera…)

And on the other hand there is the sort of observation about that destruction which is made by Roland Barthes:

‘To rob a man of his language in the very name of language; this is the first step in all legal murders.’ (Mythologies)

But of course children living today are by no means dumber (or less dumb) than were their counterparts in Barbiana. Certainly they are experiencing a similar negative loop whereby they too become forced consumers of their own production, now fed back at them in crude and distorted ways: for example as reflections of their desire to be like their peers or like their older siblings, or as their desire to create new friendships, now reflected back as the bogus friendship of celebrity. And, almost certainly, like the children of Barbiana, they know this at some level. Yet they are hardly unique in this. Rather they are victims of the process common in cognitive capitalism and which applies both to children and to adults whereby (as Alquati and others have noted: tourism is an example) production and consumption coalesce:

‘They have sold us one by one. They have sold our poor lives and our history to make a history combined with others, a fake history, that doesn’t even have a happy ending, one that finishes in indifference for everything and for everyone.’ (Stefano Benni: Saltatempo).